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FREE SPEECH FOR MUSTANGS AND
MAVERICKS
DANIEL H.

POLLITT*

Struggles to coerce uniformity of sentiment of some end thought
essential to their time and country have been waged by many
good as well as by evil men ....

As first and moderate methods

to attain unity have failed, those bent on its accomplishment must
resort to an ever-increasing severity.... Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating
dissenters. (Mr. Justice Robert Jackson in West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette,' striking down a compulsory
flag-salute law.)

Introduction
Patience, good temper, and respect for the rights of others are
among the growing casualties of the Viet Nam conflict. Although
the courts have held fast to democratic traditions, and in some
instances have extended first amendment freedoms to new fields,
the pressures of uncertainty and confusion have pushed other public agencies, and private citizens, to extreme action. A martial
spirit moved a large gang of Boston high-school toughs to beat to
the ground eleven young pacifists protesting on the courthouse steps
our presence in Viet Nam.' In Atlanta, the Georgia Legislature
twice denied an elected seat to Julian Bond because of his anti-war
expressions.'
In Ann Arbor, University of Michigan students
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.

319 U.S. 624, 640 (1943).
' Boston's Mayor John F. Collins promptly held a televised press conference where he emphasized the obligation to protect the rights of all persons: "Precisely because any protest against United States foreign policy
in Vietnam is unpopular among some citizens of Boston," he said, "it is
even more urgent to protect this right. A law-abiding city cannot tolerate
violence on its streets against those who embrace unpopular causes without
undermining our very society." CIVIL LIBERTIES, May, 1966, at 3 (publication of the A.C.L.U.).
'The Supreme Court ordered his reinstatement because "Bond's disqualification because of his statements violated the free speech provisions
of the First Amendment as applied to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment." Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 131-32 (1966). The Court
explained that "Legislators have an obligation to take positions on controversial political questions so that their constituents can be fully informed
by them, and be better able to assess their qualifications for office ...
" Id.
at 136.
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protested the war by a sit-in demonstration at the draft-board office, and promptly were denied their draft-deferred status as students.' High school students in Cleveland and Pittsburgh were
suspended for wearing black armbands in mourning for the Viet
Nam dead.' In San Francisco, the headquarters of the left-wing
W. E. B. DuBois Club was bombed and gutted by unknown arsonists. 6 In Washington, D.C., the Daughters of the American Revolution denied the use of its Constitution Hall to folk-singer and
pacifist, Joan Baez.7
When members of a small band of Catholic pacifists sought to
dramatize their protest against the war by publicly burning their
draft cards, Congress responded by making such protest a federal
offense, punishable by a fine of 10,000 dollars or imprisonment for
five years.' Subsequently, when a handful of peace demonstrators
set fire to the flag at a rally in New York's Central Park, the first
federal law in history making it illegal to "cast contempt upon any
flag of the United States"' swept through the House of Representatives, with but sixteen nay votes.
'The federal court held that the reclassification was unlawful because its
effect "was immediately to curtail the exercise of First Amendment rights,
for there can be no doubt that the threat of receiving a 1-A classification
upon voicing dissent from our national policy has immediate impact upon
the behavior of registrants and others similarly situated." Wolff v. Selective
Service Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967).
Schlesinger, McCarthyism Is Threatening Us Again, SATURDAY EVENING

PosT, August 13, 1966.

'N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1966, at 22, col. 3.
'The Department of Interior promptly made the Washington Monument
grounds available for the cancelled concert, just as thirty years earlier it
had made the Lincoln Memorial available to Negro soprano, Marian Anderson, when the DAR had cancelled her scheduled concert at Constitution
Hall8 for racial reasons.
The federal appellate court in New York assumed that draft-card burning was a form of "symbolic speech" but held that the efficient functioning
of the Selective Service System justified the limited infringement of free
protest imposed by the 1965 amendment to the draft law. United States v.
Miller, 367 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1966).
The federal appellate court in Boston disagreed, holding that the draftcard burning amendment "strikes at the very core of what the First Amendment protects." The court, however, sustained the Congressional requirement
that "possession of the draft card be maintained at all times," and remanded
the case to the trial court for resentencing without the "aggravating circumstances" of the public burning. O'Brien v. United States, 376 F.2d 538
(1st Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 36 U.S.L.W. 3125 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1967) (No.
232).
' Ironically, although commonly referred to throughout the debate as the
"flag burning" law, H.R. 1048 as passed by the House makes it unlawful to
cast contempt upon the flag or any replica thereof by "publicly mutilating,
defacing, defiling or trampling upon it." An amendment to add the word
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Close on its heals came the "Anti-Riot" legislation, punishing
those who cross a state line with the intent to incite a riot. Proponents argued that its enactment "would cramp the style and make
subject to criminal prosecution the Stokely Carmichaels, the Martin Luther Kings, the Floyd McKissicks, and others of their kind
who preach anarchy or disobedience to the [draft] law."'" A proposed amendment to protect "orderly and peaceful dissent" was
voted down with but little support."
The right to protest majority will, peacefully but with force
and vigor, is a near victim of the civil-rights tensions in our major
metropolitan centers. Kentucky clergymen in Louisville were pelted
by white hecklers with mud and ball bearings as they marched in
support of an open housing ordinance.1 2 When the hecklers grew
in number and ferocity, a local court enjoined the civil rights forces
from marching after sunset.:"
Earlier, in Chicago, Martin Luther King was stoned to the ground
while four thousand whites threw rocks, burned cars, and jeered
Negro marchers protesting segregated housing."4 As white hostility intensified against the continued marches, Mayor Daley ob"burning" to the list was expressly rejected. 113 CONG. Rxc. 7544 (daily
ed. June 20, 1967).
Three primary constitutional arguments were advanced during the debate
by proponents of the bill who recognized that "symbolic speech" in other
circumstances would receive constitutional protection.
First, the public act of desecration of our flag is so outrageous and shocking that it is beyond the pale. Reference was made to Lady Godiva, who
rode horseback down the streets of Coventry clad only in a smile to protest
by deed, rather than words, her disagreement with governmental policy.
Reference was also made in this connection to the Puerto Rican terrorists
who some years earlier had indiscriminately shot at members on the legislative floor.
Second, the public act of desecration of our flag is apt to produce a civil
disturbance, in which not only the dissenter but also the person and property
of others are exposed to an unreasonable risk of harm.
Third, the public act of desecration of our flag tends to undermine the
morale of American troops. Many members could attest to this from their
correspondence with servicemen expressing shock and disgust at such conduct. See, e.g., the statement of Congressman Wiggins at 113 CONG. REc.
7505-06 (daily ed. June 20, 1967).
10 113 CONG. Ruc. 9001 (daily ed. July 19, 1967).
11113 CONG. REC. 9000 (daily ed. July 19, 1967).
2 N.Y. Times, May 16, 1967, at 91, col. 3.
1
N.Y. Times, April 15, 1967, at 27, col. 1. The injunction limited
marches to daylight hours, excluding morning and afternoon rush periods,
restricted the number of marchers to 150 or less, and required that the police
be notified at least 12 hours before any march.
1 N.Y. Times, August 6, 1966, at 1, col. 3 (city ed.).
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tained a court injunction against the size, frequency, and location
of the civil-rights parades. 5 When Dr. King announced a Sunday
march in the all-white suburb of Cicero, officials there sought to
block the demonstration with a court injunction to stave off "obvious disaster."' 6 The march went on only after Governor Kerner
sent 2,000 Guardsmen to lead the marchers through a gauntlet of
rock-throwing whites waving the Nazi swastika and confederate
flags. 7
In Wisconsin, the situation was equally grave when the Milwaukee NAACP youth group began nightly prayer vigils at the suburban home of Circuit judge Robert Cannon to protest his membership
in an "all white" Eagles Club.' 8 At first there was little notice, but
soon the white counter-protest reached the dimension where protection was needed. Governor Knowles sent in Guardsmen whoshoulder to shoulder with fixed bayonets-held back the mobs while
teenagers cried, "Kill, kill, kill the jungle bunnies."' 9 The civilrights demonstrations ended when the state Attorney General announced plans to seek a court injunction."0
Similar situations are found the country over. But it is not only
pacifists and civil-rights enthusiasts who bear the brunt of community reaction, by mobs and by the officials. Hard times for the dissenter know no boundaries; geographical, political, or temporal.
The Ku Klux Klan
The Ku Klux Klan and related groups have been denied the right
to assemble, to speak, and to petition for redress of their grievances.
In Cicero, during the civil-rights protest, town officials warned that
they would arrest any Klansman on sight for disorderly conduct.21
In Baltimore, a Maryland court enjoined a public rally by the National States Rights Party because of the tense racial situation. 2
In Indiana, a state court enjoined a Klan rally on a private farm
near Dillsboro.2
In New Jersey, Attorney General Arthur Sills
obtained a court order against a similar Klan meeting after reading
N.Y. Times, August 20, 1966, at 1, col. 3.

N.Y. Times, August 24, 1966, at 34, col. 5.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1966, at 54, col. 2.
N.Y. Times, August 30, 1966, at 31, col. 3.
19 N.Y. Times, August 29, 1966, at 1, col. 1.
20 N.Y. Times, August 31, 1966, at 32, col. 7.
"N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1966, at 54, col. 3.
22 N.Y. Times, August 12, 1966, at 17, col. 6.
-N.Y. Times, May 20, 1966, at 41, col. 2.
1

18
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newspaper accounts that three busloads of Black Muslims from
Philadelphia intended to crash the private rally.24 Two reasons
were given for the injunction: first, that its "white only" character
violated the state's anti-discrimination laws; and second, that the
contemplated cross-burning ceremony would violate the state forest
fire regulations.2 5
A similar incident in North Carolina ended on a different note.
The problems were identical; only the protagonists differed.
In a few of the southeastern counties of North Carolina along
the Lumbee River lives a unique band. Known variously as Lumbee Indians, Croatoans, or the Cherokee Indians of Robeson County,
their origin is obscure. Some believe they are descended from the
survivors of Sir Walter Raleigh's "Lost Colony," befriended and
adopted by the nearby Croatoan Indian tribe. Others think their
origin goes back to Moors or Turks who came to fight with the
colonists during the Revolution.
The law has contributed to the mystery, and to the isolation, of
these people. From 1885 until a recent federal court decision, these
southeastern North Carolina counties required a tri-racial school
system; for whites, for Negroes, for Indians, with the quality of
educational offering descending in this order. Robeson County
even had a fourth school system: for "Smilings" whom the Indians
disowned, and who refused to attend school with the Negroes.26
Miscegenation laws isolated these people still further by prohibiting
marriage between "Cherokee Indians of Robeson County" and their
neighbors.

27

Poorly educated and hard pressed to make a living, the Lumbee
Indians remain clannish, inbred, independent, proud, quick-to-anger,
and since 1958, bitter enemies of the Ku Klux Klan.
In that year the Klan burned two crosses in Robeson County,
2, N.Y. Times, May 19, 1966, at 34, col. 4.
"N.Y. Times, May 22, 1966, at 60, col. 5.
"NORTH

CAROLINA ADVISORY COMM. TO THE U.S.

COMM'N ON CIVIL

RIGHTS, REPORT 120-24 (1962).
Northampton County lists a school as "Portuguese"; and Warren County, a school for "Haliwa." In most other counties 2and cities of the State, the Indians are assigned to "white" schools.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-3 (1965) provides that "All marriages between
a white person and Negro . . . or between a Cherokee Indian of Robeson
County and a Negro ... shall be void." Until a 1961 amendment, this prohibition also applied to a marriage between white persons and Indians and
persons of Indian descent.
On June 12, 1967, the Supreme Court held that state miscegenation laws
were unconstitutional. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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one in front of the house of an Indian woman to warn against an
affair with a white man, and the other at the home recently occupied
by an Indian family in a white neighborhood. The Klan leader,
the Reverend James "Catfish" Cole, publicized an upcoming rally
and orated on maintaining school segregation in inflammatory
terms: "If the (official) Pearsall Plan doesn't work the (unofficial)
Smith and Wesson Plan will."2
When the Klan held an announced meeting on a private farm
near the rural community of Maxton, the Indians turned out with
vengeance, and with their own "Smith and Wesson Plan." Dressed
in feathers and paint, they broke up the meeting with war-whoops
and a fusillade of 200 shots. Two people, a news reporter and a
soldier-bystander, were slightly injured by the gunfire. The state
chuckled, Grand Wizard Cole was convicted of inciting a riot and
no legal action was taken against the Indians.2"
Early in March of 1966, the Klan announced a meeting at
the scene of its earlier humiliating rout. Immediately there were
police reports and newspaper rumors that the Indians were stockpiling high-powered rifles, shotguns, dynamite, and even hand grenades. Superior Court Judge W. A. Johnson promptly issued a
temporary injunction prohibiting any Klan meeting within 20 miles
of Robeson County."
Most of the state approved; only the North Carolina Civil
Liberties Union denounced this state action as a ban on free speech.
ACLU attorney Anthony Brannon of Durham asked leave to file
a friend-of-the-court brief in support of the Klan motion to dismiss
the temporary court order prohibiting its rally. The Klan apparently wanted no such friendship. The state also opposed and the
Judge denied the ACLU motion to intervene as coming too late.
The Civil Liberties Union, however, took comfort when it became
apparent that its brief, circulated earlier, had supplied the grist of
oral argument.
Malcolm Seawell, a former North Carolina Attorney General,
led off for the state with over 170 affidavits warning of violence.
One such affidavit, from the State Bureau of Investigation, told
that Grand Dragon Robert Jones always carried a .38 caliber pistol,
and that over 16 M-1 carbines and 50 tear gas tins were counted
2' State v. Cole, 249 N.C. 733, 107 S.E.2d 732 (1959).
9
'
Id.
ae Durham Morning Herald, March 31, 1966, at 3, col. 1.
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at a recent Klan rally. Seawell told the court that if the Klan met
in the area, "there will be bloodshed, there will be loss of life, and
there will be damage to property." 3'
Klan attorney Lester Chalmers made no attempt to counter the
allegations of violence, but instead centered his arguments on the
constitutional rights of free speech and assembly. He told the court
that the Klan planned no violence, that any trouble would be initiated by the Indians, and that the "State has time to provide police
protection." The Klan attorney recalled that Governor Hodges a
few years earlier had sent the National Guard to strike-torn Henderson and added: "If the state can provide protection to a mill
owner, I believe it can provide equal protection to the KKK for an
exercise in freedom of speech." 32
On April 18, Judge Johnson held for the Klan. The Judge
admitted that his decision "was not an easy one," but he ruled that
the objecting Indians "have no right to protest by taking up arms;"
and that "freedom of speech and freedom of assembly are so vital,
I cannot see how this court can deny an organization the right to
,33
meet."
Robeson County Sheriff Malcolm McLeod commented after the
decision that he still thought violence would erupt if the KKK came
into Robeson. Grand Dragon Jones, however, was jubilant: "If
I break the law, I expect to be locked up. If anyone else breaks the
law, I expect them to be locked up." He admitted, however, that
plans for a Klan rally in Robeson were indefinitely postponed.'
Despite the humorous overtones, this episode illustrates serious
and recurrent questions going to the heart of the right to dissent:
the right of rejected minorities to assemble and sponsor ideas which
are odious to the majority in the community. The decision here in
favor of speech is of significance to everyone, not merely to Klan
members. If the threat of Indian mob violence justifies a state
injunction prohibiting a KKK meeting, no minority organization
is safe. Vigilante groups would find an easy route to silence unpopular views. By threatening lawless violence, hoodlums could
intimidate state and local officials into cancelling meetings of labor
M Durham Morning Herald, April 1, 1966, at 12, col. 2.
"Greensboro Daily News, April 19, 1966, at 1, col. 7.
"Id. at col. 4.
"Id. at col. 8.
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unions, peace groups, World Federalists, civil rights organizations,
dissident religions-the list is endless.
Fortunately for free speech and assembly, the Klan decision in
North Carolina signifies that the law does not permit the suppression
of unpopular views, presented in a peaceful and orderly fashion,
merely because others resent these views and resort to lawless action.
Decisions arising out of earlier efforts to silence other unpopular
minorities clearly support the constitutional right of Klansmen to
assemble on a private farm and there don hooded robes, burn a
cross, sing a hymn, and build up their collective ego by condemning
Jews, Catholics, Negroes and even Lumbee Indians as inferior
creatures.
Labor Unions
Labor unions have gradually, and grudgingly, won the rights
to assemble, to distribute leaflets, to picket, and otherwise to carry
on their organizational activities. For many years trade unionists
were considered illegal conspirators and outside the law. Such was
the situation during the mid-1930s in Jersey City. When the CIO
first sent organizers there, Mayor Hague destroyed their leaflets,
arrested the organizers, and dumped them on ferryboats destined
for New York. He justified this suppression on the theory that
the CIO was a "Communist organization," and that CIO organizers
inevitably would create "riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage." The Supreme Court admitted that the total prohibition of
speech would prevent riots, but this would be throwing out the baby
with the bath. It held that suppression of free expression "cannot
be made a substitute for the duty to maintain order in connection
with the exercise of the right." 5
A few years later the Supreme Court again upheld the right of
labor unions to disseminate their views in an unfriendly environment.
Here, Alabama sought to preserve peace and order in the community
by outlawing all picketing in an inflammatory situation. A local
union leader named Thornhill was arrested for "unlawful intimidation" when he violated a state law making it illegal to picket "at or
near the scene" of a labor dispute. Alabama argued that "violence
and breaches of the peace" are inevitably and invariably "the concomitants of picketing" and that consequently the latter can be
prohibited to prevent the former. But the Supreme Court disagreed.
"5Hague v. Committee for Indus. Organization, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
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It told Alabama that it could preserve the peace by arresting lawbreakers if and when violence erupted, but that it had a primary
obligation to protect picketers and "freedom of discussion on matters of public concern."3 6
The harassment of trade union organizers continues to this day
in certain areas of the country. One device widely used in the
southeast is the municipal licensing ordinance. These ordinances
make it a crime for a union or union organizer to solicit anyone to
join a union without first securing a license. Usually an exorbitant
license fee is fixed, and sometimes there is a daily fee or a fee for
each person joining. On occasion, the application for the license
must be verified by a local citizen of "good repute." Although these
ordinances seem clearly unconstitutional, 37 they continue to proliferate.3"
The harassment of trade union organizers and their sympathizers
is sometimes more direct. In July of 1967, five ministers from California were arrested in Texas as they gathered at the local jail to
protest the arrest of striking agricultural workers by reciting the
Lord's Prayer. The charge-disturbing the public peace.3 9
Minority Religious Groups
Not only labor unions, but also the dissident and minority religious groups have trouble when their views are antagonistic to
the more orthodox community beliefs. But the courts, on many
occasions, have upheld the right to preach these views, even in the
face of local disorder and tumult.
One such case involved Carl Kunz, an ordained Baptist minister whose conviction and duty was to "go out on the highways and
byways and preach the word of God." In 1948, he preached around
Columbus Circle in New York City where he ridiculed and denounced other religious beliefs. "The Catholic Church," he said,
"makes merchandise out of souls ;" and the Jews are "Christ-killers"
who "should have been burnt in the incinerators." These utterances,
as one might expect, stirred strife and violence. Kunz testified that
he had become acquainted with one of the complaining witnesses,
" Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 98 (1940).
"Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958) ; Denton v. City of Carrollton, 235 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1956).
"8Brief for AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae at 12-15, Walker v. City of Birmingham, 385 U.S. 809 (1966).
" 113 CONG. REc. 8998 (daily ed. July 19, 1967) (statement of Rep. Frank
Thompson, Jr., Chairman of the Special Subcommittee on Labor).
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whom he thought to be a Jew, "when he happened to sock one of
my Christian boys in the puss." He also testified, "I have trouble"
when the police are absent, but "with an officer, no trouble."
Kunz's street-preaching license was revoked because of the fist
fights, and he was convicted and fined ten dollars for his subsequent
preaching without one. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief
Justice Vinson, reversed, because the denial of the license unlawfully
suppressed free speech. The Court added that apart from denying
a preaching license to a known troublemaker like Kunz, there are
more "appropriate public remedies to protect the peace and order of
the community."40
One appropriate remedy would be to arrest Kunz if he spurred
his own followers into lawless conduct. Such an arrest for disorderly conduct was sustained by the Supreme Court when violence
erupted after a street orator in Syracuse, New York, urged the Negroes in his mixed audience to rise up in arms."
Another remedy to preserve the peace, when the speaker is lawful, is to have police available in case of lawless conduct by the
listeners. This was the approach used by a United States Court of
Appeals when Jehovah's Witnesses were set upon and beaten shortly
after World War II by the "G. I. boys" in Lacona, Iowa.
The Jehovah's Witnesses take literally the biblical admonition
against paying homage to "graven idols," and refuse to salute or
otherwise honor the American Flag. In past years, this refusal has
raised the ire of many, just as today the "flag burning" at peace
rallies draws public condemnation. This was the situation in 1946
when the Witnesses attempted to hold a series of four Sunday meetings in the town park of Lacona.
At the first of such meetings, while the speaker was preaching
on "Religion as a Peacemaker," he was heckled and jeered. When
the Jehovah's Witnesses returned for the second meeting, a crowd
of 700 or more filled the park, and there were "numerous fist fights,
with the usual results-bloody faces, black eyes, broken glasses and
teeth, and torn clothing." During the third week, the Sheriff deputized over 100 local citizens to prevent a breach of the peace, and
the deputies used their power to block the Jehovah's Witnesses'
entrance to the town.
,0Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951).
' 1 Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
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The federal court told the town officials to turn their power the
other way and to protect the Witnesses, by arresting the "G. I.
boys" if necessary. "Certainly," held Judge Sanborn, "the fundamental rights to assemble, to speak and to worship cannot be
abridged merely because persons threaten to stage a riot or because
peace officers believe or are afraid that breaches of the peace will
occur if the rights are exercised."'
Elsewhere, Jehovah's Witnesses ran into trouble while they were
holding a district convention at the high school in Duncan, Oklahoma. Local citizens drove a sound truck through the Sunday
streets exhorting "red blooded Americans" of Duncan to come to
the high school and "fight for the flag." They did, armed with
"sticks, rocks, guns and other instruments of violence." They broke
up the assembly and beat up the Witnesses until the city firemen
quenched the violence with a water hose. Subsequently, the Witnesses sued the chief of police and other city officials for failure to
provide protection, and won. The federal court of appeals held that
the city officials had an obligation "to make the Jehovah's Witnesses
secure in their right to peaceably assemble," and that "one charged
with the duty of keeping the peace cannot be an innocent bystander
where the constitutionally protected rights of persons are being invaded. He must stand on the side of law and order or be counted
'48
among the mob."
Right Wing Groups
An even stormier session took place in Chicago when Father
Terminiello, a suspended Catholic priest, gave a speech under the
auspices of the Christian Veterans of America. Gerald L. K. Smith
and other well known right wingers had sponsored and publicized
the meeting, and it opened behind a protesting picket line of over
1,500 persons. Once inside, Terminiello gave an inflammatory
speech. He said that "Queen Eleanor [Mrs. Roosevelt] is now
one of the world's communists," that "Franco was the saviour of
what was left of Europe," and, about "Communistic Zionistic Jews,"
that "we want them to go back where they came from." He described his reception outside the hall: "The street was black with
people on both sides for at least a block either way; bottles, stink
bombs and brickbats were thrown. About 28 windows were broken."
"Sellers v. Johnson, 163 F.2d 877, 881 (8th Cir. 1947).
"Downie v. Powers, 193 F.2d 760, 764 (10th Cir. 1951).
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The crowd constituted "a surging, howling mob hurling epithets at
those who would enter and tried to tear their clothes off."
No one in the mob was arrested, but Terminiello was tried for
disorderly conduct and found guilty under a law making it illegal
to give a speech which "stirs the public to anger, or creates a disturbance." The Supreme Court reversed. Mr. Justice Douglas held
that this was the very function of constitutionally protected free
speech: that "it may indeed best serve its high purpose when it
induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions
as they are, or even stirs people to anger." He noted that "speech
is often provocative and challenging . . . and may have profound

unsettling effects as it presses for an acceptance of an idea." But
such speech must be protected, said the Justice, for "the alternative
would lead to standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts
'
or dominant political or community groups."44
Right wing speakers also have had trouble in New York City,
at least initially. George Lincoln Rockwell, self-styled Nazi, asked
permission to give a Fourth of July speech in Union Square, a small
place in the heart of New York's crowded business area. Park
Commissioner Morris denied the permit, because a Nazi meeting
at that location and on that patriotic day could not be held "without
resultant disorder, riot and violence endangering city property and
the safety and welfare of the residents." On appeal, the New York
court ordered the permit. Mr. Justice Breitel said: "Only if Rockwell speaks criminally can his right to speak be cut off. If he does
not speak criminally, then, of course, his right to speak may not be
cut off, no matter how offensive his speech may be to others. Instead, his right, and that of those who wish to listen to him, must be
protected, no matter how unpleasant the assignment."'4
A more respectable conservative ran into similar licensing difficulties. William Buckley, publisher of the National Review and
later Conservative Party candidate for mayor, had a lease to use
a hall at Hunter College for a series of talks. At one of them,
Jacques Soustelle, a leader of the French right wing movement,
spoke on the necessity of keeping Algeria French. This meeting
aroused great controversy and was picketed. Thereupon, Hunter
"Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
"Rockwell v. Morris, 12 App. Div. 2d 272, 211 N.Y.S.2d 25, aff'd nee.
10 N.Y.2d 721, 176 N.E.2d 836, 219 N.Y.S.2d 268, cert. denied, 368 U.S.
913 (1961).
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College, a municipal institution, cancelled the lease for further meetings because the point of view presented was "opposed by substantial parts of the public." Buckley promptly brought suit against
President Meng of Hunter College, and the New York court ordered
that the lease be reinstated. This was on the "simple principle" that
the state cannot do indirectly what it may not do directly. "Since
there is no power in the state to stifle minority opinion directly by
forbidding its expression," remarked Justice Markowitz, "it may
not accomplish this same purpose by allowing its facilities to be
used by proponents of majority opinion while denying them to dis48
senters.
Civil Rights Demonstrators
It is the Civil Rights Movement, however, which has done most
to establish the legal principle that "Constitutional rights may not
be denied simply because of hostility to their exercise." These were
the words of Mr. Justice Goldberg when the Supreme Court told
the City of Memphis that it could not delay integration of city parks
to avoid "interracial disturbances, violence, riots, and community
confusion and turmoil. ' 47 This was the sentiment of Mr. Chief
Justice Warren when the Supreme Court told the Little Rock School
board that it could not postpone integration in its Central High
School because of "extreme public hostility" on the outside, or
because of "chaos, bedlam and turmoil" within.4" It was for this
reason that the Supreme Court sustained the right of Negro students
in South Carolina4 9 and Louisiana 0 to march in large numbers protesting Jim Crow policies, even though "a dangerous situation was
really building up" among the white onlookers."
The lower federal courts have protected the rights of Negro and
White protesters throughout the South: in Albany, Georgia, where
Judge Bell directed the city police to protect the Negro marchers
from the three to four thousand aroused spectators ;52 in St. AugusBuckley v. Meng, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924, 35 Misc. 2d 467 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
,T
Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963)
48 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
"Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 376 U.S. 776 (1964); Fields v. South
Carolina, 375 U.S. 44 (1963); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229
(1963).
"Cox
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
81 Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
'"Kelly v. Page, 335 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1964).
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tine, Florida, where Judge Simpson told the police chief to protect
the nightly 'marches to the Slave Market from the "armed toughs
and hoodlums, Klan types, armed with sticks, metal rods, chains,
knives, etc. ;-153 in McComb, Mississippi, where Judge Tuttle held
for the Freedom Riders that "the discontent and unrest of the local
populace resulting from the unpopularity of racial integration in the
bus terminal, are no grounds to prohibit what otherwise would be a
constitutionally guaranteed right and freedom."5 4
When the Freedom Riders left Anniston, Alabama, their bus
was dynamited; and when they reached Montgomery, they were
assaulted while the police stood by without "lifting a finger." Judge
Johnson promptly ordered the Klan leaders responsible to cease all
violence or face contempt of court, and he ordered the police chief
to cease "failing or refusing to provide protection for all persons
traveling in interstate commerce in and through the City of Montgomery.
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The most vivid illustration that "Constitutional rights may not
be denied simply because of hostility to their exercise" is found in
the Selma march for voting rights. After weeks of fruitless effort
to register while Sheriff Jim Clark said "never," the Reverend
Martin Luther King announced plans to publicize the local vote
denial with a march on the state capitol in Montgomery. Governor
Wallace issued an official proclamation "absolutely banning the
march" and said "it would not be tolerated." When the Negro
demonstrators began their long trek, state troopers drove them back
across the Selma bridge with tear gas and billy clubs while local
deputies on horseback rode them down. King and the other civil
rights leaders turned to the federal court for protection, and Judge
Johnson came to their aid.
The federal judge saw the potential of danger on the five day
walk for freedom but held that "hostility to this march will not
justify its denial. Nor will the threat of violence constitute an excuse for its denial." The court ordered "police protection in the
exercise of this constitutional right to march along U.S. Highway
80 from Selma to Montgomery," despite the "considerable burden
imposed upon the law enforcement agencies of the State of Ala5

'Young v. Davis, 9 Race Rel. L. Rep. 590 (1964).
Congress of Racial Equality v. Douglas, 318 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1963).

"United States v. U.S. Klans, 194 F. Supp. 897 (M.D. Ala. 1961).
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bama."' 58 Ultimately, the United States underwrote the police protection costs by federalizing the state national guard.
Conclusion
It is understandable why local authority desires to curb a march
protesting local conditions and customs of long tradition. It is easy
to sympathize with the desire of elected officials to arrest an out-ofstate Freedom Rider, whose mere presence creates an incendiary
situation. It is natural to side with the Lumbee Indians, and chuckle
that the Klan is getting its due when a state judge bans a crossburning ceremony. It is understandable why a Park Commissioner
would deny a self-styled Nazi a permit to harangue in the heart of
New York's garment district on the Fourth of July. Why, then,
does the Constitution give protection?
The short of the matter is that once the state gives rein to vigilante power, against the unworthy and for beneficient purposes, we
are all the loser. No one can tell who will be next. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter explained why the privacy of even a wartime blackmarketeer must be protected against a governmental search and
seizure:
It is easy to make light of insistence on scrupulous regard for the
safeguards of civil liberties when invoked on behalf of the unworthy. It is too easy. History bears testimony that by such
disregard are the rights of liberty extinguished,
heedlessly at
57
first, then stealthily, and brazenly in the end.
Much earlier, Mr. Justice Brandeis explained the rationale for
curbing police wire-taps, even when used in the aid of law enforcement against bootleggers:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect
liberty when the government's purposes are beneficient. Men
born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their
liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty
lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well meaning
but without understanding. 58
Protection of the "unworthy" is especially essential in the area
of free speech and assembly, where the response to a bad idea may
Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 597 (1946). This was a dissenting opinion, but there was no disagreement with this sentiment.
" Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (dissenting
opinion).
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in turn spark new concepts and insights. The maverick who departs the herd might well blaze short-cuts to Armageddon, or at
least to new and accessible way stops. Society needs the plow horse
with blinders; it also needs the sometimes unique contribution of
the mustang who kicks over the traces. The country is big enough
for all. Mr. Justice Holmes put forth the "theory of our Constitution" in these famous words when he sought to protect free speech
for the Communists at the close of World War I:
When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired
is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which
their wishes safely can be carried out.59
There is nothing new or novel about this concept. It was advanced almost 2,000 years ago by a Pharisee named Gamaliel at
the trial of Peter and John. ° After the Crucifixion, the Apostles
gathered in Jerusalem to teach the people. Peter and John worked
miracles before an ever-increasing throng; they even healed a lame
beggar at the temple gate. For this they were arrested and brought
before the "rulers, elders and scribes." Annas, the high priest,
"commanded them not to speak at all nor teach in the name of Jesus."
Peter and John disregarded this mandate, and were again brought
before the council because of their continued preaching. The High
Priest asked: "Did we not straightly command you that ye should
not teach in his name?" The Apostles answered: "We ought to
obey God rather than men." The elders, "when they heard that,
they were cut to the heart, and took counsel to slay them." Then,
"stood there up one in the council, a Pharisee, named Gamaliel, a
doctor of the law." Gamaliel reviewed the history of earlier
Prophets-Theudas, Judas of Galilee, and others-who momentarily
had gained large followings, and then concluded:
And now I say unto you, Refrain from these men, and let them
alone: for if this counsel or this work be of men, it will come to
nought; but if it be of God, ye cannot overthrow it; lest haply
ye be found even to fight against God.
'

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (dissenting opinion).

The Acts, Chapter 5.
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As the chapter concludes, "to him they agreed," and when they had
called the apostles, and beaten them, they let them go.
It is not necessary to equate Peter and John with today's dissenters to ask whether the United States should be less receptive to
radical concepts than the theocratic state of ancient Israel.

